讲座题目 | Information Disclosure in a Supermodular Game | ||
主讲人 （单位） | 杜宁华教授 （上海财经大学） | 主持人 （单位） | 汪敏达 （bevictor伟德官网） |
讲座时间 | 2025年4月28日10:30 | 讲座地点 | 经管楼A208 |
主讲人简介 |
杜宁华，上海财经大学经济学院常任教授，微观经济系系主任，“中国行为与实验经济学论坛”第三届执行主席。2005年获得美国亚利桑那大学经济学博士学位，主要研究领域是行为与实验经济学。杜宁华近年来致力于运用实验经济学的实证方法考察行为机制设计的基本问题，对市场机制进行深层次的探讨。其研究成果发表在管理学顶级国际刊物Management Science，包括Games and Economic Behavior，European Economic Review在内的经济学国际一流刊物上，以及Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization，Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Decision Support Systems等著名经济学和管理学国际期刊上。 | ||
讲座内容摘要 | We experimentally study the effectiveness of information disclosure in a binary-action supermodular game with state-dependent payoff. An information designer, who observes the state, aims to maximize the choice of high (instead of low) action by the players who are unaware of the state. The players prefer the high action when the state is “favorable”; when it’s “unfavorable”, they prefer the low action. The designer utilizes information disclosure to induce high action. We find in the experiment that, compared to no disclosure, both truthful and persuasive disclosures can raise frequency of the high action. We also find that, contrary to predictions, persuasive disclosure fails to be better than truthful disclosure. | ||
